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Simulation of the Impact of Social and
Economic Institutions on the Size

Distribution of Income and Wealth
By FREDERIC L. PRYOR*
In the vast literature on the distribution

causal forces operating in the real world.

of income, relatively little systematic atten-

The most important biases (mostly lead-

tion has been paid to the mutual influence

ing to greater income equality) arising

of the distributions of income and wealth

from the simplifying assumptions of the

on each other, and to the impact of inter-

model are also discussed below.

generational grants on the entire process.

To take all the major long-run factors

The purpose of this essay is to utilize a

influencing the size distributions of income

simulation model in which the distribu-

and wealth into account is an extremely

tions of income and wealth are analyzed

complicated matter, and we face two alter-

together. The model permits me to explore

native research strategies; either we model

the influences of such socioeconomic vari-

these factors mathematically, which re-

ables as the pattern of intergenerational

quires some drastic simplifications in order
to keep the equation system solvable,' or

grants, the rules of inheritance, the patterns of mate selection, differential fertility

we take more factors into account by

of various income classes, and the pat-

simulating their impact. While the latter

terns of governmental redistributions of

procedure does not lead to a completely

income and wealth. So many simplifying

general solution it does permit us to in-

assumptions must be made that the model,
as it is presented below, cannot be directly

vestigate certain features of economic systems using parameters of particular in-

used for determining the current size dis-

terest.

tribution of income and wealth; neverthe-

To place this model in perspective, it is

less, the results of the model suggest cer-

useful to note that variance of personal

tain neglected factors, particularly the

income can be derived from three sources;

shape of the intergenerational savings

variances in the distribution of labor in-

function, that must be taken into account

come, of property income, and of the in-

if we are to gain a clearer picture of the

teraction between these two variables.2 In
this model, variations of labor income are

handled by assigning everyone a lifetime

* Professor of economics, Swarthmore College. I wish
to thank Howard Pack, J. Roland Pennock, Frank C.

income equal to the average lifetime in-

Pierson, Zora Pryor, and George Stolnitz for their help-

ful suggestions on an earlier draft. The research for this

1 Such an approach is followed by Joseph Stiglitz

essay was financed by the International Development

anid, in a less formal fashion, by James Meade.
2 The higher the correlation between individual labor

Research Center of Indiana University and was carried
out at the Economic Growth Center of Yale Universitv.
A considerable amount of difficult work was done by
those who programmed this extremely complicated
simulation model, and I would especially like to thank
the chief programmer, Carol Hopkins. I would also like

and property incomes, the more unequal the distribution of income. (See formula in fn. I1.) The correlation

can, of course, be negative, a situation that apparently
arose in mandarin China where receivers of property

income made a special point of avoiding manual work,

even if it meant a lifetime of poverty. (See Hsiao-Tung
to express my apl)reciation to David Forman and
Michael Hooven for assistance at particular points. lFei.)
50
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come times a random variable with a mean

The chances for a person marrying anyone

of unity and a specified standard deviation.

else are equal (the equal-choice rule); 3) A

Variations in property income stem only
from differential holdings of wealth; re-

person can marry anyone but the chances

turns per unit of wealth are assumed

other on the income distribution (the
limited-choice rule).'

equal; and, finally, no correlation is

are greater if the two are closer to each

assumed between individual labor and

The government can then step in and

property incomes. Thus the critical factor

redistribute income (either progressively or

for a change in the distribution of income

regressively). This is followed by the ac-

is a change in the distribution of wealth

cumulation or disposal of family wealth

which, in turn, is greatly influenced by

(positive or negative savings) so that a

the different socioeconomic variables specified below.

specified ratio of family wealth to family

I. The Basic Model3

income is achieved; this intergenerational

savings function is discussed in detail
below. Asimplifying assumption used in the

The simulation model starts with 100

model is that all wealth and net changes in

unmarried people with an arbitrary initial

wealth (net savings or dis-savings) are in

distribution of productive wealth. These

the form of productive capital which yield

people are "put to work" and both life-

property income.

time labor and property incomes are generated by means of a production function
(a Cobb-Douglas function is used at first

children according to their income in the

but a CES function is later tried) with
assumptions of full employment and of
mean factor payment equal to its marginal

product. The total amount of property
income is divided among all wealth
holders in amounts proportionate to the
quantity of wealth held by each; the total
amount of labor income is distributed to
the entire population by giving each a

At this point the various families have

following manner: First, the families are
divided into three groups according to
whether they are among those with the

highest family incomes, lowest incomes, or
in-between. (The percentage of families
falling in each group can be varied.) Then
the number of children are specified for
each group, for example, the rich can be
designated to have more or fewer children

than the poor (or vice versa). Polygynous

wage equal to the average wage times a
normally distributed variable (which is
supposed to represent a differential distribution of abilities such as intelligence or
diligence).
The people in the model are then lined
up according to income, and marriages are
arranged according to one of three different rules: 1) A person can only marry
another person next to him on the income

of course, changed when a couple is married and re-

scale (this is called the no-choice rule); 2)

moved from the pool of eligibles. Therefore, the state-

3The model rests on the pioneering work of Guy
Orcutt. Other simulation models of income distribution

mately true. For the limited-choice model, the probabil-

have been made (for example, Hans-Juergen Krupp),
but these are considerably different than mine and,

ence in income rank between the two individuals. The

situations can be approximated by specifying many children for the rich and no
children for the poor, since in such societies
it is well known that only the wealthier can
afford to support many wives and the low
income men often do not marry.
The parents are then removed from the

scene and family wealth is divided among
4The probabilities of one person marrying another is,

ments in the text must be considered as just approxi-

ity of marriage is inversely proportional to the differcalculations are simplified by not designating the sex of

moreover, have focused primarily on short-run prob-

the individuals so that marriages b)etween any two

lems.

individuals may be possible.
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the children according to one of three

In the tables I use Gini coefficients as a

different rules: 1) One child can receive

measure of this inequality of the equi-

everything (the primogeniture rule) ;5 2)

librium size distribution of lifetime in-

The property can be divided equally

come. Gini coefficients are measured by

among all children (the equal-division

calculating Lorenz curves and measuring

rule); 3) The first child can receive half of

the ratio between the "area of inequality"

the wealth and the remainder is divided

and the total income triangle (the coeffi-

equally among the rest (the compromise

cient ranges from 0.00, which represents

rule). At this point the government can

total equality to 1.00, which represents

also redistribute wealth (a type of inheri-

total inequality). I have computed four

tance tax). We now have a group of people

other statistical measures of inequality but

with a given distribution of wealth of

space does not permit their inclusion. In

productive capital whom we put to work;

certain cases where it is useful to discuss

the process is repeated many times to see

relative speeds of convergence, the period

if a stable distribution of income and

is measured from the starting point to the

wealth is achieved.

point when an equilibrium Gini coefficient

With only a few exceptions (discussed
below) the processes converge toward an

amounlt) .6

is achieved (plus or minus a small

"equilibrium distribution" which, when

Before the numerical results are pre-

attained, is maintained for all succeeding

sented, certain features of the model may

generations. In certain cases, however, the

perhaps be better understood if we exa-

process is extremely slow and in order to

mine in a qualitative fashion the effect of

avoid inordinate computer expenses, the

particular variables.

following procedure was adopted. In every

A. The Simplest Patterns

case the simulation was carried out twice,
once starting from a highly unequal initial

If we take a situation where every

distribution of wealth (where the wealthiest

family, regardless of income, has two chil-

10 percent of individuals share the total

dren; where there is no variation in labor

societal wealth in equal portions) and once

income (the random factor is not yet in-

starting from a relatively equal wealth dis-

troduced); and where families do not add

tribution (where the wealthiest 75 percent
of individuals share in equal amounts the
total wealth). Each simulation is then run

(i.e., family wealth is passed on unchanged

to, or decrease, their inherited wealth
regardless of income, a situation occurring

for 30 generations (which represents 1000
years if a generation is calculated as 334
years, or 750 years if a generation is 25

when land is the basic source of wealth and

years) and the end results of the simulations starting from different points are

are quite simple and are outlined in Table
1 below.

averaged; in almost all cases the two esti-

With primogeniture wealth accumulates
eventually into a single hand.7 TIhe speed
of convergence is inversely proportional to
the degree to which people choose marriage
partners in other income brackets. With

mates were very similar to each other.
5 I have used an extreme form of primogeniture in
which the first child, regardless of sex, obtains the entire
family's wealth. This variant of primogeniture leads to

the most extreme wealth-holding inequalities and, in
addition, is computationallv simpler in that sexes do
not need to be assigned to particular individuals for

the model to work. A more usual case of primogeniture
is, of course, when only the eldest son obtains the
entire estate.

is not alienable), the observed patterns of
convergence of the distribution of wealth

6 The exact method employed is described in the
Appendix.

I If the eldest son variant of primiiogeniture is used,
then, of course, this extreme result wN ill not obtaini.
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TABLE 1-BASIC EQUILIBRIUM PATTERNS OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH
Marriage rules

Inheritance rules No-choice rule Limited-choice rule Equal-choice rule
Primogeniture Wealth concentrates to a single Same as no-choice rule, Same as no-choice rule, but con-

owner; fast convergence. but convergence is slower. vergence is slower than other
primogeniture situations.

Equal division Wealth distribution remains Wealth becomes evenly dis- Wealth becomes evenly disthe same as starting position. tributed but convergence is tributed; convergence is faster
slow. than with limited-choice rule.

equal division of inherited property and

B. The Impact of a Random Variable

with everyone marrying a person next to

Representing Abilities

him on the income distribution, it should

If we now introduce a random variable

be readily apparent that no change will

representing differential abilities so that

occur in the size distribution of income and

labor incomes are the product of the aver-

wealth, as long as all families continue to

age wage times a random variable (with a

have two children. In the other two cases
with equal division of inherited property,
wealth eventually becomes completely
equally distributed.

mean of unity), the basic patterns are
modified in the following ways:

1) The greater the variation in the

The compromise rule of inheritance,

random element, the more unequal the
equilibrium income distribution in those

where the first child received half of the

five cases in Table 1 where convergence is

property and the remainder is divided

observed. This is because greater ex-

equally among the other children, is the

tremes in labor income are generated.

same as the equal-division rule (under the

assumption of two-child families).

2) In situations where people are al-

lowed choice in marriage partners, the

The speed of conversion to equilibrium

convergence process is speeded up where

depends, of course, on the distribution of

there is an equal division inheritance rule
and slowed down where there is primogeniture. This stems from the fact that there

wealth at the starting point and at
equilibrium. Starting from a highly unequal distribution of income, convergence
is achieved in the primogeniture case in

three to five generations; starting from the

is a greater mixing of people of different
wealth at the time of marriage (since the
marriage rules are based on total income,

more equal distribution of wealth, con-

not wealth alone). Where people marry

vergence takes six to fifteen generations.

those next to them on the income scale, a

For the equal-division cases where con-

complication arises which is discussed

vergence occurs, the process generally

below.

takes somewhat longer. Although con-

One important methodological point
also arises. Introduction of a random element raises difficulties in determining the
exact equilibrium distribution of income.
In interpreting the various tables presented below, small differences in the coefficients should be overlooked and, al-

vergence speeds in the above examples appear to have little economic meaning, they
become important when governmental

policy measures are introduced (i.e., redistribution of income and/or wealth) and
certain goals of income distribution are set.
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though data are presented to three places,

different marriage and inheritance rules

variations of several percent or less should

are presented. There is no accumulation of

usually be neglected.

Throughout the remaining simulations
the random factor is set with a standard

wealth for the society as a whole and each
family passes on only that wealth which it
inherits.

deviation of 15 percent, which is roughly
similar to the variation of I.Q. test scores.

TABLE 2-GINI COEFFICIENTS OF EQuILIBRIUM INCOME
DISTRIBUTION ASSUMING DIFFERENT MARRIAGE

C. The Impact of Differential

AND INHERITANCE RULES

Fertility Rates

In all cases primogeniture leads to a
highly unequal income distribution since,

whatever the fertility pattern, only one
child receives all the property. Similarly,

in all cases where the rich have only one
child (which leads automatically to primogeniture) a highly unequal equilibrium
income distribution is also generated.
In nonprimogeniture cases, fertility

affects the end results considerably. In
cases where fertility increases with income,
the system should converge relatively
quickly to fairly even distributions. (Such
a situation allegedly occurred in past eras
in oriental despotic societies where the

Marriage Rules

Inheritanice No- Limited- EqualRules Choice Choice Choice

Primogeniture .307 .308 .297
Compromise a .064 .060
Equal Division a .064 .060

Assutmptions: No net family capital formation; no capital or income redistribution; all families have two chil-

dren; standard deviation of the random element is .15;

labor share of national income is 75 percent.

a If the system starts from a highly unequal distribution of wealth, the equilibrium distribution of income is
equal to its original value. If the system starts from a
relatively equal wealth distribution where high ability

people with no property might marry low ability people
with property (since they would be next to each other on

the income scale), then the equilibrium income distribution would be highly equal.

rulers encouraged polygyny so that the
rich would have a much higher fertility

As expected, the inequality of income is

rate than other classes and, at the same

higher with primogeniture than with the

time, forbade primogeniture; the end re-

compromise or equal division inheritance

sult was supposed to be an economy with a
relatively even distribution of income and
no independent bases of wealth with

cause each family has only two children).
As we also expect, the equilibrium income

which to challenge royal authority.)8
Simulation results of different patterns

fected by the marriage rules; in this simple

of fertility among the income classes are

model the major effect of the marriage

rules (which give the same answers be-

distribution does not seem greatly af-

presented in Appendix Table 1. For

rules appears on the speed at which

simplicity, in the rest of the paper, I
assume that fertility is the same in all

equilibrium is achieved. Only in much
more complicated models do the marriage

income classes unless otherwise specified.

rules appear to have much impact on the

II. Quantitative Results: No Saving;
Stationary Population; No

One puzzling phenomenon appears in the

Technological Change

We are now ready to begin the quantitative investigation. In Table 2 below, the
results for the most simple situation with
8 Such systems are analyzed by K. Wittfogel.

equilibrium size distribution of income.

primogeniture case where the other measures of inequality give somewhat different
results but this is due most likely to a
change in the shape of the distribution of
income, with slightly increasing inequality
at the high income end and slightly de-
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creasing inequality at the middle and
lower income levels. This particular result

does not appear due to random factors
since equilibrium was achieved from all
starting points of the simulation and the
various results given particular marriage
and inheritance rules were very similar.

In the simulation model a wealth redistribution process can be set up so that all
inherited wealth is taxed a given per-

tributions are most unequal for the primogeniture cases and most equal when family

property is evenly distributed among
heirs, a result similar to the previous findings. The marriage rules again have a relatively small impact. It must be noted that
with very high redistributions of wealth,
the differences in the equilibrium distributions with the various marriage and inheritance rules are relatively small; it

taxed wealth is distributed equally among

appears that after a certain point, the
redistribution swamps the effects of other

all individuals. If the tax rate is positive,

institutions.

then such a process is progressive because

Since the redistribution of wealth can
be a deliberate tool of governmental policy,

centage and then the total amount of

the least wealthy end up with a net gain in
wealth while the most wealthy end up with
a net loss. This manner of specifying a
capital tax on inherited wealth allows the
total amount of privately held wealth to
remain constant.

The results of imposing a capital re-

distribution tax are presented in Table 3

and can be summarized quite easily: The
greater the redistribution of wealth, the

more equal the equilibrium distribution
of income and wealth. This, of course, is
not surprising. The equilibrium income dis-

the rate of convergence to the equilibrium
income distribution is of considerable in-

terest. Several generalizations can be
made: First, imposition of a redistribution
of wealth greatly increases the speed of
convergence and in almost all cases convergence is achieved within five generations (with the major portion of the
changes occurring in the first two generations). Second, convergence appears to be
faster when the model is started with relatively more unequal wealth distribution

TABLE 3-GINI COEFFICIENTS OF EQUILIBRIUM INCOME DISTRIBUTION
WITH DIFFERENT REDISTRIBUTIONS OF WEALTH
Marriage Rules
Redistribution and

inheritance rules No-Choice Limited-Choice Equal-Choice
No redistribution of wealth

Primogeniture .307 .308 .297
Equal division a .064 .060
30 percent redistribution of wealth

Primogeniture .156 .158 .148
Equal division .061 .063 .063
60 percent redistribution of wealth

Primogeniture .088 .091
Equal division .062 .062

.089
.064

90 percent redistribution of wealth

Primogeniture .061 .066 .064
Equal division .062 .062 .062
Assumptions: see Table 2
a See fn. a, Table 2
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than with a relatively more equal wealth

in the economic literature: empirical data

distribution. In other words, achieving a

with which to derive such a function are

more equal distribution of income by

unavailable and theorists who insist on

means of a redistribution of wealth can be

deducing propositions about consumer be-

carried out more quickly in those cases

havior from the neoclassical axioms of

where the differences between actual and

rational choice have not been able to say

desired distributions are greatest.

Introducing a redistributive income tax

anything about the matter. One reasonable
assumption, which is reflected in numer-

changes, of course, the equilibrium income

ous obiter dicta on the subject, is that the

distribution. In this case wealth is not

amount of wealth passed on by a husband

affected; and since marriages are arranged

and wife to their children is primarily a

according to relative income, this part of

function of lifetime family income and it

the system is not affected either. Under the

is on this basis that the model is changed

assumptions in this section about no-net

below. The shape of the function is still

intergenerational accumulations of family

problematical and experiments are carried

capital, the speed of convergence toward

out with several different formulae.
Second, once we introduce changes in

the equilibrium income distribution should
not be affected. However, once we allow

the net capital stock, a problem arises be-

net intergenerational accumulation of capi-

cause we must also take into consideration

tal based on family income, then an in-

the possibility of multiple stable growth
paths;9 thus the initial conditions of the
system and the way in which the intergenerational transfer function are specified
become quite important. In order to avoid
such complications, care was exercised in
designing the intergenerational transfer
function so that only a single stable growth
path, independent of the initial conditions,
would be achieved. A number of tests were
also made with different initial conditions
(different initial capital stocks) in order to

come redistribution could have a number

of effects on total savings, growth, and
convergence and provides a much more
interesting problem for analysis. Discus-

sion of the effects of a redistributive income tax is therefore deferred until the

rigid assumption about the integenerational transfer function is loosened.
III. Quantitative Results: Introduction
of an Intergenerational
Savings Function

insure the correctness of the specification.

Let us now allow the capital stock to

A third problem arises in the choice of

change, while still keeping the total popu-

the production function, i.e., the function

lation constant, so that we can isolate some

showing the relationship between the

of the effects of different patterns of in-

capital and labor in the system and total

tergenerational savings and transfers. One

production. All production functions used

of the most important results of the simu-

below exhibit diminishing returns to varia-

lation exercise is to show that the shape of

tions in the capital-labor ratio. This

this function has crucial importance on the

means, among other things, that the ratio

equilibrium income distribution. Before

of capital to labor asymptotically ap-

turning to the results, however, several

proaches a limit which represents a

theoretical questions deserve brief exami-

"steady-state equilibrium" where depre-

nation.

ciation just equals gross savings and net

First we must inquire about the nature

of the integenerational transfer function.

Up to now this has been a terra incognita

9 This problem is analyzed in an abstract but lucid
manner by Stiglitz.
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capital formation is zero. Such diminishing

family has "dipped into capital." A second

returns can, however, be offset by tech-

type of intergenerational transfer function
has a kink in it and is thus non-linear; such

nological change so that in "steady-state
growth" production, the capital stock and
the ratio of capital to labor rise at the

same rate of growth. In this particular

case (Harrod-neutral growth), labor productivity (the ratio of output to the constant labor force) also rises at the same

rate while capital productivity asymptotically approaches a constant.
One last precautionary note must be
added. Although the analysis below focuses
almost exclusively on income distribution,
it must be emphasized that the various
types of intergenerational transfer func-

tions, production functions, and redistribu-

transfers are a function of income over and
above some socially determined "subsistence level," below which no intergenerational transfers are made (i.e., the
family doesn't pass on inherited wealth).
Since negative intergenerational transfers
(i.e., debts) are not permitted (although

dipping into capital is allowed), the kink
of the savings function occurs at Y. The
simple form selected for this non-linear
function is S=(Y-Y)z, S>O.
A brief digression is necessary to clear

up certain ambiguities of this subsistence
level. First, this is not necessarily the bio-

tions of wealth and income lead to quite

logical subsistence level nor does there

different equilibrium levels of production.
Although there are a number of proposi-

need to be any explicit societal recognition

tions in the economic literature linking the

that such a subsistance level actually
exists. Rather, it is merely the income

level below which families feel they must
spend all of their funds for consumption
equal the distribution of income, the
in order to try to achieve a certain stangreater the aggregate production), the redard of living and as a result, they do not
sults below show exceptions to such genhave any wealth left over to pass on to
eralizations. For those interested in pursusucceeding generations. If per capita ining the relationship between income discome in the society rises and the socially
tribution, the savings function and growth, determined subsistence level remains stasome data on steady-state production
tionary, this subsistence level may evenequilibria are given in Appendix Tables
tually become such a small proportion of
2, 4, and 6.
individual family income that the savings
function is, for all intents and purposes,
A. The Impact of Linear and Non-Linear
linear, i.e., the performance of the system
Intergenerational Transfer Functions
asympototically approaches that of a sysTwo types of integernerational transfer
tem with an intergenerational transfer
functions are used in the analysis below.
function of S= Yz. On the other hand, the
The first is a simple linear function where
socially determined subsistence level can
intergenerational transfers of a particular
also rise as society views on an adequate
family are a proportion of lifetime income:
standard of living rise. Since this might be
S= Yz where S= intergenerational transa reasonable approximation of reality, it is
fers; Y= family lifetime income; and z is
useful to tie the subsistence income to the
the "savings constant" to be specified. If
rise in per capita income. For simplicity, I
family income is low and inherited wealth
have set the subsistence income always
is great, the intergenerational transfer
equal to average per capita income which
(proportionate to income) might be less
means that when a non-linear intergenerational transfer function is used, only those
than the original inherited wealth, i.e., the
inequality of income to the growth rate of

production (for example, the more un-
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TABLE 4-GINI COEFFICIENTS OF EQUILIBRIUM INCOME DISTRIBUTION ASSUMING
DIFFERENT INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSFER FUNCTIONS

Marriage Rules
Transfer functions and

inheritance rules No-Choice Limited-Choice Equal-Choice
S= Yz
Z=1.5

Primogeniture

.165 .165
.069 .067

.161
.060

Primogeniture .167 .169
Equal division .066 .066

.162
.063

Equal
z

=

division

2.0

z=2.5
Primogeniture

Equal

.

division

165 . 170 . 164
.065 .063 .062

S= (Y-Yf)Z
z = 2.0

Primogeniture
Equal

division

.306
.293

.301

.300

.266

.206

z

= 2.5
Primogeniture .308 .309 .306
Equal division .296 .260 . 199

Assum?lptions: All families have two children; standard deviation of random element is
.15; labor share of national income is 75 percent; no income or capital redistributions;
no technical change; no negative transfers.
Note: S = intergenerational transfers; Y = personal incomes; V = average income;
z =a constant.

families with incomes above the average

how low the family income might be be-

pass on wealth to the succeeding genera-

cause of the low labor incomes received by

tion. Finally, it must be noted that the

the parents. Such a situation does not

socially determined subsistence level can

seem very realistic and these experiments

rise faster than average income and in this

were abandoned. The results of simula-

strange case with such a strong "demon-

tion experiments using both linear and

stration effect," families might dip into

non-linear intergenerational transfer func-

capital (as long as they did not run into

tions for several different parameters of the

debt) until little capital would be left in

savings coefficient (z) are presented in

the society as the subsistence level ap-

Table 4 above.10

proaches the highest family incomes.

The non-linear transfer function leads,

Experiments were also made with a
third form of the intergenerational transfer
functions: S== W+ Yz, where W is the

wealth inherited by the mother and father
of the family from their parents. This
function implies that the wealth inherited
by the children is always greater than the

wealth inherited by the parents, no matter

1I If the capital-output ratio is greater than unitv, the
average - coefficient must be greater than unitv or there
must be a multiplicative constant in the production
function if the capital stock in the economy is to be
maintained. In the results reported in Table 4, z is
placed larger than unity. If a multiplicative constant
were used in the production function, z could be made
less than unity (which, of course, makes more "real
life" sense) but the results would be the same.
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as one might expect, to a much greater inequality of income than the linear function; for in the former case, only the richer
segments of the population pass on wealth
to their children and this, in turn, concen-

trates wealth and property income. With
a simple linear transfer function, the
height of the savings coefficient (z) does
not appear to affect the inequality of the
equilibrium income distribution (the differences do not appear statistically significant) although, of course, a higher z
leads to a higher steady-state production
level. On the other hand, a higher savings
coefficient does seem to affect the degree
of income inequality when a non-linear
function is used, although the direction of
the effect depends upon the particular
measure of inequality that is chosen and
the inheritance rule that is followed.
With the introduction of intergenerational transfer functions based on income,
we now have a situation where the marriage rules have a more important impact
on the equilibrium income distribution
than in the previous section where capital
was passed on regardless of income. With
primogeniture the effect of the marriage
rules is small in almost all cases except
with one nonreported inequality measure.
On the other hand, with equal division of
property, especially with a non-linear transfer function, the inequality of the equilibrium income distribution decreases as
the marriage rules change toward equal
choice.

tribution are differentially affected. Thus
no generalization is possible.

TIo summarize, with a linear transfer
function where families at all income levels
pass on wealth to the succeeding generation, the primary influence on the equilibrium distribution of income is the inheritance rules; and marriage rules or the
height of the savings constant (z) have
little effect. With a non-linear intergenerational transfer function, the equilibrium
income distribution is affected by the

marriage rules, the inheritance rules, and
the height of the savings constant. Generalizations in these latter cases are difficult

because the overall inequality and the shape
of income distribution curve change simultaneously.
B. The Impact of Income and
Capital Redistributions

A redistribution of capital in each
generation not only affects the distribution

of income but also, in the case of a nonlinear intergenerational transfer function,

the growth of the system. (This is because
the share of income over the subsistence
level is a smaller ratio of total income

after a redistribution). The effect on the
equilibrium distribution of income should
increase with the severity of the redistribu-

tion and, one might suspect, would greatly
affect the equilibrium distribution in the
case of a non-linear, rather than a linear,

transfer function. Relevant data are pre-

sented in Table S below which supports

Generalizing about the relationsips between equilibrium income distribution, inheritance rules, and transfer functions is

more difficult. With a linear intergenerational transfer function, primogeniture
leads to a more unequal distribution of

these conjectures.

An X percent redistribution of income in
each generation should have a greater

impact on the equilibrium distribution of
income than an X percent redistribution of

wealth because in the latter case only one
source of income inequality is being
rules. With a non-linear transfer function,
changed. This differential impact of an inthe results depend upon the measure of income redistribution should also be greater
equality chosen since the relationships bein the case of a non-linear intergenerational
tween different parts of the income dissavings function because the effect on the
personal income than other inheritance
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TABLE 5-GINI COEFFICIENTS OF EQUILIBRIUM INCOM&E DISTRIBUTION
WITH DIFFERENT CAPITAL REDISTRIBUTIONS
Marriage Rules

Redistribution taxes and

inheritance rules No-Choice Linmited-Choice Equal-Choice
S =Yz, (z= 2.0)
No redistribution

Primogeniture .167 .169 .162
Equal division .066 .066 .063
30 percent capital redistribution

Primogeniture .121 .120 .123
Equal division .061 .060 .060
6() percent capital redistribution

Primogeniture .086 .081 .087
Equal division .063 .064 .063
90 percent capital redistribution

Primogeniture .065 .064 .064
Equal division .062 .062 .062
S=(Y-Y)z, (z=2.0)
No redistribution

Primogeniture .306 .301 .300
Equal division .293 .266 .206
30 percent capital redistribution

Primogeniture .233
Equal division .220 .

.229 .226
190 . 126

60 percent capital redistribution

Primogeniture .144 .145 .133
Equal division .134 .103 .089
90 percent capital redistribution

Primogeniture .069 .070 .068
Equal division .063 .062 .064
Assumitptions:

share of income over the subsistence level
vis-a-vis the total national income would
be greater. And finally, the effect of an

See

Table

4

Again, we observe the fact that convergence to the equilibrium income distribu-

the extent of the redistribution and (using

tion is very much speeded up with the
imposition of either a redistribution of income or wealth tax program. Again, con-

the same arguments employed in the case

vergence is achieved usually in a few gen-

of the capital redistribution) should affect

erations although the parameters of the
equilibrium are somewhat different than

income distribution should increase with

the equilibrium distribution more in the
case of the non-linear than of the linear
transfer function. These conjectures re-

ceive support in the data presented in
Tables 5 and 6 although certain ex-

ceptions do arise, especially when other
inequality measures are used. Although the
underlying reasons for these exceptions are
obscure, part of the difficulty may lie in the
changing shape of the income distribution
curve that accompanies the overall
changes in equilibrium inequality.

those discussed in Section II.
Since these income or capital taxes may

serve as deliberate policy tools by the
government to achieve particular income
distribution goals, we must turn briefly to
the convergence properties of the system.
In the case of the linear intergenerational
transfer functions, the situation is very
similar to the case where there was no net
capital formation in each family and convergence occurs very rapidly, usually in
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TABLE 6-GINI COEFFICIENTS OF EQuILIBRIUM INCOME DISTRIBUJTION
WITH DIFFERENT INCOME REDISTRIBUTIONS

Marriage Rules
Redistribution taxes and

inheritance rules No-Choice Limited-Choice Equal-Choice

S= Yz, (z= 2.0)

No redistribution

Primogeniture .167 .169 .162
Equal division .066 .066 .063
30 percent income redistribution

Primogeniture .112 .115 .112
Equal division .046 .044 .043
60 percent income redistribution
Primogeniture .062 .064 .062
Equal division .024 .026 .024
90 percent income redistribution
Primogeniture .015 .016 .015
Equal division .006 .006 .006

S = (Y-Y)z, (z= 2.0)
No redistribution

Primogeniture
Equal division
30 percent income redistribution
Primogeniture
Equal division
60 percent income redistribution
Primogeniture
Equal division
90 percent income redistribution
Primogeniture
Equal division

.306 .301 .300
.293 .266 .206
.216 .215
.202 .176

.212
.130

.124 .123
.118 .105

.121
.064

.031 .031 .030
.029 .026 .019

Ass,umptions:

See

Table

4

several generations. In the case of the
non-linear intergenerational transfer func-

paribus clause is that such taxes do not

tion, the system approaches the equilib-

have adverse effects on productivity.) Al-

rium distribution equally rapidly; but in
the wealth redistributions, the Gini co-

generation for the major effects to take

nation. (One condition in the ceteris

though radicals may be unwilling to wait a

efficient of income inequality often cycles
place and prefer instead a revolution to
around the equilibrium value several
times, rather than asymptotically approaching it.

Since the greatest changes in income
equality brought about by the income or
wealth redistribution occur in the first
generation and since differences between
the actual degree of income inequality and
the equilibrium value are quite small after
a few generations, one lesson seems clear:
other things being equal, redistribution
taxes appear an efficient method of changing the degree of income inequality in a

accomplish redistribution aims, the de-

struction of capital and confusion following such events might lead to a situation

where average income would be considerably lower and income not much more
equally distributed than if mundane and
undramatic redistributional taxes had
been used instead.
C. The Impact of the Elasticity
of Substitution

Up to now the results are based on a
Cobb-Douglas prodtuction function which
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has an elasticity of substitution of unity.

growth which can arise from many differ-

Since we have growth in the system, this
assumption may have some impact on the
results and a series of simulations were run
using the CES function that has been explored by Kenneth Arrow et al.11

ent patterns of differential fertility, a large

Summarizing the results in a capsule
form is extremely difficult for a number
counteracting factors influenced the results: further, the results feature a number
of small puzzles which are difficult to explain. For those wishing to explore these
matters further, the results are presented
in Appendix Tables 3 and 4.

number of cases are open to explore.

Simplification can be achieved once we
realize that introduction of population

change has two major effects: it raises the
absolute value of total production; and it
allows different rates of growth of the
of
capital-labor ratio to occur through
changes in the denominator of the fraction, rather than the numerator. Rather
than multiply examples endlessly, it seems

most useful to examine only several simple
patterns of fertility in order to show how
the system works. One financial constraint

IV. Quantitative Results: Introduction

on this process of analysis must also be

of Certain Dynamic Factors

mentioned: the greater the number of

A. The Impact of Harrod-Neutral
Technological Change

people in the system, the more expensive

If we introduce technological change
such that the production arising from a
given capital and labor stock is multiplied
by an exponentially growing factor, per
capita income grows, the capital stock
grows (because savings increase), and
eventually the system achieves a steadystate growth path. Using a Cobb-Douglas
production function, factor income shares
remain the same.

The results of the simulations can be
easily summarized: the equilibrium income
distributions do not seem greatly affected
by the introduction of Harrod-neutral
technical change. (Indeed, the only noticeable effects occur with the non-linear
transfer function and these are relatively

small.) Undoubtedly other types of technological change would complicate the
results, but exploration of these matters
must be left for future research. Results

of the experiments with Harrod-neutral
change are presented in Appendix Table 5.
B. The Impact of Population Change
If we now add to the analysis population

the simulation becomes. To obtain the results reported in Table 7, I started the
system with only fifty people; introduced a
10 percent population growth (per generation) and ran the system for only
twenty-five generations. This led to an
eightfold increase in population and, as a
result, almost a quadrupling of computer

cost. (It must also be noted that in order
to limit population growth, "poor" and

"rich" families are defined as the 20 percent of families on either end of the in-

come distribution, while the "middle class"
is the remaining 60 percent; this is slightly
different than the income definitions used
in calculating Appendix Table 1 below.)
Equilibrium gross national products are
presented in Appendix Table 6.

The most surprising result appears

where the transfer function is linear: here
differential fertility appears to have relatively little impact on the equilibrium distribution of income, a result which is some-

what different from the situation in Appendix Table 1 where no net capital formation takes place. In the case of the nonlinear transfer function, on the other
hand, the expected impact of differential

fertility can be observed in nonprimo11 See Arrow et al. For the derivation of factor shares
geniture situations, i.e., the equilibrium
I used the simple formulae derived by R. G. D. Allen.
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TABLE 7-GINI COEFFICIENTS OF EQUILIBRIUM INCOME DISTRIBUTION
WITH POPULATION CHANGE AND DIFFERENT FERTILITY PATTERNS

Marriage Rules
No-Choice Limited-Choice Equal-Choice

S =Yz, (z =2.0)
Number of children
Rich M.C. Poor
2

2

2

Primogeniture

.167

.169

.162

Compromise .066 .066 .063
Equal division .066 .066 .063
3
2
2
Promogeniture

Compromise
Equal

.082 .178 .175
.071 .068 .071

division

.065

2
2
3
Primogeniture

Compromise

Equal

.069

.182

.176

.075

division

.076

.074

.066

.175
.073

.073

.072

.301

.300

S=(Y-Y)z, (z=2.0)
2

2

2

Primogeniture

.306

Compromise .293 .266 .206
Equal division .293 .266 .206
3

2

2

Primogeniture

.314

Compromise .273
Equal division .230
2

2

.313

.309

.253 .169
. 185 .127

3

Primogeniture

.313

.310

Compromise .309 .296
Equal division .306 .294

.312

.194
.219

Assutmiiptions:

Standard

deviation

function with labor share of national income as 75 percent; no technological change; no
income or capital redistribution; no negative transfers.

distribution appears more equal, the

capital-labor ratio are somewhat lower

greater the number of children of the rich

which, as a result, means that returns per

vis-a-vis other groups in the population.

growth gives rise to a somewhat more un-

unit of capital are higher and returns per
unit of labor are lower. The exact interaction of these various factors is, however,

equal equilibrium distribution of income

complex. 12

It should also be noted that population

than with no population growth and it
seems likely that this effect would be

12 Some insight can be gained into these matters by

greater if population growth were higher.

starting from the well-known formulas for the separation

This may be tied up with the results that

with population growth, the equilibrium
per capita income and the equilibrium

of the components of variance;
Var(Y) =Var(P)+Var(W)+2 Cov(P, W)

and Var(P)> i2 Var (k) +lk2 Var(i)-+2ikCov(i, k)
(over)
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investments yielding high returns; further,

the existence of great wealth often permits
Given the assumptions of the model, the

numerical results obtained in the simulations cannot be directly applied to available data on the distribution of income.

Certain biases resulting from the assumptions require special attention.
First, the model assumes that labor income of an individual is not positively correlated with his parents' income. Since it
is generally believed that there is, indeed,
a positive correlation, this means that the
results presented above have a bias toward
equality. In future simulations this fact
could be built in the model either directly
(a procedure which would require considerably more memory capacity of a
computer than the program used in this
study) or by using a different type of
intergenerational savings function in which
a fraction of the parents' income would be
considered human capital transmitted to
the children.

Second, the model assumes that labor
income and property income are not positively correlated. Although data have not

been published in a useable form empirically to investigate such matters, I
strongly suspect that in the United States
there is a positive correlation. Certainly
those occupying important positions to
which high labor incomes accrue are in a
better position to invest their money in

people to obtain positions yielding high

labor incomes. If this correlation between
labor and property income is positive, then

the empirical results obtained with the
simulation model show a greater income
equality than actually exists. Repairing
this fault in the model would not be
difficult: labor income could be made a
function of the random variable plus a
given fraction of wealth.

Third, for technical reasons labor incomes in the model were bounded by
limits of .5 and 1.5 of the average income,
and since capital accumulation is a function of total income, certain limits are
placed on the amount of capital accumulation that one individual can carry out.
Since this does not permit the existence of
a Henry Ford, a J. Paul Getty, or a John
D. Rockefeller, who manage to accumulate enormous sums within a single lifetime, the results of the simulation model
show a bias toward equality. This might
be repaired in the model by designating
one person in each generation who is
destined to strike it rich at the expense of

everyone else (who is "taxed" for this
purpose).
Fourth, the distribution of income is
calculated from labor and property income

before family accumulation (or disaccumulation) takes place. This procedure omits a
where Y= total personal income; P = property income; source making for greater income inW=work income i=return on wealth; k=wealth;
equality, namely the income accruing to
Var( Y) = variance of Y; Cov(i, k) = covariance between
owners of recently accumulated wealth.
i and k; and a bar over a letter indicates an average
In the model presented above, this should
value. In the case discussed in the text, i2 increases,
Var(k) remains the same, the k2Var(i) factor still renot make very much difference; but in

mains zero (since there is no variation in return per unit
more complicated models, this factor must
of capital) and the covariance term remains roughly the
be taken into consideration. On a more
same. Thus the overall variance in property income
rises and this, in turn, leads to an increase in the varigeneral level, the simulation model is
ance of overall personal income. Certain other puzzling
based on the assumption that capital acphenomena remain, particularly in the data for the
cumulation for the entire society occurs
non-linear savings function; these are due in part to the
fact that unlike most other simulations in this essay,
through the net addition to inherited proequilibrium was achieved extremely slowly and often by

the twenty-fifth generation (the cutoff point), this

equilibrium point had not been reached.

ductive capital by various families in the

system. An alternative method for achiev-

This content downloaded from 130.58.65.13 on Wed, 16 Aug 2017 16:52:36 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

VOL. 63 NO. 1 PRYOR: DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME AND WEALTH 65

ing economic growth that does not involve

facing many different size distributions of

inheritance occurs when claims on produc-

income and wealth.

tive capital are accumulated through part

Seventh and finally, our knowledge

of a person's lifetime and then are con-

about the actual parameters of the system

verted into consumption by the end of the
person's life. If generations overlap and if

distribution of income and wealth is quite

that would influence the equilibrium size

the maximum accumulated wealth is

limited. Most importantly, we have no

greater for each succeeding generation,

statistical idea about the shape of the inter-

then societal capital accumulation could

generational savings function which proves

occur without any inheritances.'3 Although
such extreme a situation does not seem

such a critical factor in determining the

very likely, such a process may be occurring in part and the equilibrium income
results of the simulation model would have
a further bias toward equality. T his factor

know the relative importance of more com-

final equilibrium positions. We do not

plicatecl inheritance arrangements where
wealth is passed two generations away
through particular types of trust arrange-

could be incorporated into the model, but
considerably more memory space in the
computer would be required.

marriage patterns and inheritance rules
may be greater, but such matters still need

Fifth, in the simulation model factor incomes are distributed according to the

considerable quantitative analysis before
parameters can be derived for use in the

marginal productivity theory. T his is not,
however, a crucial aspect of the model
since by substituting different coefficients
in the production function one can easily
change the share of income received for the
services of labor and capital. Although I
have not considered any interactions between relative factor shares and some of
the other parameters of the system (on the
grounds that no convincing evidence of
such a relationship has been found), such
an effect could easily be incorporated into
the simulation.'4

model. Except for some imaginative work

Sixth, the model is allowed to run to

sophisticated models, the results obtained

equilibrium which, in many cases, takes

point toward a number of factors neglected

ments. Our quantitative notions about

by Robert Summers, little work has been
done on calculating lifetime size distributions of income.'5 Ihus, even if the simulation model were more sophisticated, we
would not have the requisite knowledge of

the proper parametrs for running the
model for predictive purposes.
VI. Some Speculations

Although the simple simulation model
has some obvious shortcomings and must
be viewed as a starting point for more

twenty or so generations. Much more use-

by economists interested in the size dis-

ful for policy purposes would be examination of situations where, starting with the
current size distribution of income and

tribution of income. Aloreover, the results
permit several different answers to some

wealth, the model were allowed to run only

the degree of inequality of the size distribu-

for several generations. TIhe purpose of

tion of income over time.

puzzling questions regarding changes in

letting equilibrium be achieved is to give

Among Western non-Marxist econo-

some general results about the direction of

mists there seems to be some agreement

change that may be of use to analysts

that the distributions of income and wealth

13 Such a situation is explored l)y James 'IIobin.
14 I would like to thank Steven Resnick for his ideas
on this theme.

15 Lifetime income distributions in the United States

are estimated bv Summers. I would like to thank him

for sending me a copy of this extremely useful study.
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of nations become increasingly unequal
during the early stages of the development
process but that after the development
process is well underway, this distributional tendency is reversed and the income distribution becomes increasingly
more equal. Certain empirical evidence
supports this proposition. For instance, in
the United States estimates of the distribution of wealth show an increasing inequality throughout the ninteenth century, reaching a high point at the turn of
the century. Since then, however, these
data show that the inequality of wealth
holding has declined so that the Gini coefficient of wealth inequality was roughly
the same in 1962 as in 1860.16 In this
century the inequality of personal wealth
holdings appears to have decreased in the
United Kingdom as well."7 Finally, income

digression I would like to add one additional explanation based on the simulation
results above.

In a highly underdeveloped nation the
major source of wealth is land; inheritances consist primarily of intergenerational transfers of a fixed amount of land;
and the equilibrium distribution of income
in such a case is described in Section II. As

industrialization begins and accunmulated
industrial capital becomes an important
source of wealth, it seems likely that the
intergenerational transfer function ap-

proaches the non-linear form described

in Section III. T his is because the biological level of subsistence is still a substantial

proportion of average income an(l it is
unlikely that people with relatively low
incomes could pass on a very significant
proportion of their lifetime income to their

inecquality has decreased in a great many

heirs. As per capita income rises, this

developed nations in the last 30 to 60
years and there appears to be an inverse

biological subsistence income becomes an
increasingly smaller share of average in-

comes and it seems likely that the income
relationship in the WTest between the level

of development and the Gini coefficient of
income inequality on both a time-series

level below which no intergenerational

transfers take place does not rise as fast as

and a cross-section basis.18 A number of

average income. If so, then the non-linear

theoretical arguments concerning the
causes of such shifts in the distribution of
income have been offered"9 and in this

intergenerational transfer function asymptotically approaches the linear case.

In such a situation, three stages in the

distribution of wealth and income can be
16 For relevant data see Lee Soltow, Robert Lampman, and James Smith.
distinguished: a stagnant stage in which

17 Data are presented by Lampman, p. 214.
the distribution of wealth and income re18 The four most extensive recent international commain
relatively constant; the initial stages
parisons of the size distribution of income are by Simon
Kuznets, Irving Kravis, Harold Lydall (who only
of industrialization in which the distribucovers labor income), and Richard Weisskoff.
tion of wealth and income become increas19 Kuznets (1955) focuses on the shift from rural to
ingly
more unequal (under the impact of a
urban areas as the most important casual factor. (This
model is investigated more throughlv on a theoreticalnon-linear intergenerational savings funclevel by Henri Theil, and on an empirical level by
tion); and a later stage of industrialization
Weisskoff.) Stiglitz bases an explanation for the same
in which the distribution of wealth and
phenomenon on the relationship in the process of
economic growth of the starting point to the equilibrium
income become more equal when the interproduction level. R. Albert Berry focuses on unemploygenerational transfer function becomes
ment and changes in particular market imperfections.
more
linear.
Others have focused on more politcal factors such as the
increase of political mobilization accompanying ecoSince we know very little about internomic development that leads to greater progressive
generational transfers at any stage of deredistribution of income and wealth by the government
velopment,
this scenario of developmenit
after a particular point of development.
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must remain speculative; nevertheless, it

onstrated is critical in predicting changes

does provide a focus for future empirical

in the size distribution of income and

research.

wealth.

VII. Two General Conclusions

A great many different cases have been

discussed, and these are but a small fraction of the possible cases that can be generated by the model. Nevertheless. two
general conclusions can be drawn:

First, for a general theory of the size
distribution of income, we must take into
account the influence of the size distribution of wealth; and this means we must bring

into the analysis a number of important
social and economic variables such as the

APPENDIX

Determiniation of the Speed of Conv,ergence to
an Equilibrim Income Distribution

Due to the influence of random factors in
the inheritance-marriage simulation program, the generated income distribution does
not completely converge to a singleincome
distribution, but rather to a band of inconme
distributions around the equilibrium. A numiber of curve-fitting methods were attemnpted
in order to derive the equilibrium distribution but these proved unsatisfactory and the
following alternative method was adopted.
This is a mlodification of a method suggested

pattern of intergeneratioinal transfers of

by Richard N. Cooper, to whomii I would like
to express my thanks.
in the society, and differential patterns of First, an unweighted average and standard
fertility of income classes. It is impossible
deviation of the Gini coefficient of income
to generalize about long-run changes in the
equality were calculated for the last five
size distribution of income and wealth in
generations in the thirtNv-generation simulacapitalism without specifying many more
tion. The sixth to last Gini coefficient was
then tested to see if it fell within the .95
variables than economists have usually
confidence limit of the calculated average.
done. Blanket predictions about increasing
If this was the case, then the unweighted
concentration of income and wealth, for
average and standard deviation were recalcuexample, the orthodox Marxist analysis of
lated to include this datum and the next

income anid wealth, the rules of inheritance

such problems, implicitly make too many
vital assumptions to be of much use.

Second, the simulation model presente(d
in this paper provides a starting point for
such a broader type of analysis of the
distribution of income and wealth. In order
to bring the analysis closer to actual situations in particular countries, much more
empirical and theoretical work needs to be
done. On the theoretical side, we need to
consider many more complications than
those presented in this essay; on the
empirical side we need to have a much
clearer picture of the critical parameters.

The model does, however, point to one
extremely important factor-the shape of
the intergenerational savings function-

which has been neglected by previous
analysts and which I hope to have dem-

Gini coefficient was examined in a like manner. This process was stopped wheni the
examined coefficient did not nmeet the test;
the number of generations was then determined, and average coefficient for the other
indicators of inequality (for example, the
standard deviation of the logarithms of income, the share of income accounted for by
the top 10 percent, etc.) were recorded.
Then, with the calculated standard deviation of the Gini coefficient from the above
process, I started from the first generation
to see at what generation the Gini coefficient
had a significant chance of belonging to the
calculated equilibrium. When this point was

reached, the generation number was recorded. The conversion point was considered
to lie between this point and the earliest
generation to be included in the calculation
outlined in the first step.
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Such a procedure is based on the assump-

Whether such a convergence occurred at all

tion that the income distribution converges

was determined by visual inspection of the

by and large within thirty generations.

entire series of calculated Gini coefficients.

APPENDIX TAB3LE 1--GINI COEFFICIENTS oF EQUJLII3RIUM INCOME D)ISTR11RUTIONS
ASSUMING DIFFERENTIAL F ERTILITY RATES"
Marriage Rules

No-Choice Limited-Choice Equal-Choice
Number of childrena
Rich M.C. Poor
2

2

2

Primogeniture .307 .308 .297
Compromise 1) .064 .060
Equal division t, .064 .060
3

2

1

Primogeniture .309 .309 .306
Compromise .075 .074 .076
Equal division .074 .069 .074
l

2

3

Primogeniture .308 .308 .298
Compromise .303 .304 .301
Equal division .308 .300 .295
1

3

1

I'rimogeniture

.310

.306

.300

Compromise .306 .305 .295
Equal division .308 .302 .295
3

1

3

Primogeniture .310 .306 .303
Compromise . 168 .160 .135
Equal division .168 .158 .130
Assitmptions: No net family capital formation; no capital or income redistributions;
standard deviation of random element is. 15; labor share of national income is 75 percent.
a The poor are those 25 percent of families with the lowest income; the rich are those 25
percent of families with the highest incomes.

b If the system starts from a highly unequal distribution of wealth, the equilibrium
distribution of income is equal to its original value. If the system starts from a relatively
equal wealth distribution where high ability people with no property might marry low
ability with property (since they would be next to each other on the income scale), then
the equilibrium income distribution would be highly equal.
A Gini coefficient of zero represents total equality; a coefficient of unity represents
total inequality.
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APPENDIx TABLE 2-EQUILIBRIUM GROSs NATIONAL PRODUCTS WITH COBI3-DOUGLAS PRODUCTION

F"UNCTIONS AND DIFFERENTIAL SAVINGS FUNCTIONSa
Marriage rules

No-choice Limited choice Equal choice
Inheritance rules
Equal
Equal
Equal
Primogeniture division Primogeniture division Primogeniture division

S= Yz: any income or capital redistribution
z=

I.5

114

114
114
114
114
z=2.0
126
126
126
126
126
z
=
2.5
136
136
136
136
136

114
126
136

S (Y- Y)z
No redistributions
z=2.0
79
78
79
75
79
z
=
2.5
85
84
85
79
85

71
73

z=2.0, income redistributions of R percent
R=0.0%
79
78
R=30.0
70
69
R=60.0
58
5
7
R=90.0
37
36

79
70
58
37

75
65
55
34

79
70
58
37

71
57
47
31

z=2.0, capital redistributions of R percent
R
=
0.
0%
79
78
79
75
79
R=30.0
70
70
70
66
70
R
=
60.0
58
58
58
54
58
R=90.0
47
48
49
48
47

Assuniptions:

All

71
58
52
47

familes

income is 75 percent; no negative saving; no technical change.
Notes: S=personal savings; Y=personal income; Y=average income; z=a constant.

a For the equilibrium GNP using the non-linear saving function, production at the 30th generation was u
equilibrium value.
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APPENDIX TABLE 3 GINI COEFFICIENTS OF EQUILIBRIUM INCOME DISTRIBUTION
WITH DIFFERENT PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS
Marriage Rules

Production functions, transfer

and inheritance rules No-Choice Limited-Choice Equal-Choice

S= Yz, (z= 2.0)
CES, s = 1.5

Primogeniture .208 .208
Equal division .061 .060
Cobb-Douglas
Primogeniture .167 .169
Equal division .066 .066
CES, s=0.5
Primogeniture
Equal

division

.102
.079

.200
.059
.162
.063

.101

.102

.076

.074

S=(Y-Y)z, (z=2.0)
CES, s= 1.5
Primogeniture .234 .233 .237
Equal division .220 .188 .117
Cobb-Douglas
Primogeniture .306 .301 .300
Equal division .293 .266 .206
CE S, s = 0.5
Primogeniture .404 .402 .405
Equal division .400 .377 .327

Assuznptions: All familes have two children; standard deviation of random element is
.15; no technological change; no income or capital redistribution; no negative transfers.
Notes: S=intergenerational transfers; Y=personal income; Y=average income;

z=constant; L=labor force; K=capital stock; P=total production; b=a constant;
s = elasticity of substitution.

Production functions: Cobb-Douglas: P =L.75K 2
CES: P=[.75L-+.25K 1]-Ib, where b=(1/s)-1
APPENDIX TABLE 4 EQUILIBRIUM GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCTS WITH DIFFERENT
PRODUCTION IJUNCTIONSa

Marriage rules

No-choice Limited-choice Equal-choice
Inheritance rules

Production
Equal
Equal
Equal
functions Primogeniture division Primogeniture division Primogeniture division
S = Yz, (z = 2.0)
CElS, s = 1. 5 131 131 131 131 131 131
Cobb-Douglas 126 126 126 126 126 126
CES, s=0.5 117 117 117 117 117 117
S=(Y-Y)z, (z=2.0)

Cl.S,
s
=
1.
5
75
74
75
72
75
Cobb-Douglas
79
78
79
75
79
CES,
s=0.5
86
85
86
82
86

Assumnitptions:

All

67
71
73

families

no technical change; no capital or income redistributions.

Notes: S= personal savings; Y=personal income; Y =average income; z=a constant; s=elasticity of substitution.
a See fn. a, Appendix Table 2.
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APPENDIX TABLE 5 GINI COEFFICIENTS OF EQUILIBRIUM INCOME DISTRIBUTION
WITH HARROD-NEUTRAL TECHNICAL CHANGE
Marriage Rules
Transfer functions and

inheritance rules No-Choice Limited-Choice Equal-Choice

S=Yz, (z=2.0) No technical change
Primogeniture .167 .169
Equal division .066 .066

.162
.063

Technical change= 10% per generation
Primogeniture .165 .165 .161
Equal division .069 .067 .060
Technical change=20% per generation
Primogeniture .165 .165 .161
Equal
division
.069
.067
.060

S=(Y-Y)z, (z=2.0) No technical change
Primogeniture .306 .301
Equal

division

.293

.266

.300
.206

Technical change= =100C, per generation
Primogeniture .308 .305 .309
Equal division .300 .253 .190
Technical change = 20% per generation
Primogeniture .308 .305 .309
Equal division .300 .253 .191

Assiumptions: All families have two
income is 75 percent; no income or c
Notes: S = intergenerational transf
APPENDIX

TABLE

6-EQUILIBRIUM

RATES AND POPULATION GROWTHa
Marriage rules

No-choice Limited-choice Equal-choice
Inheritance rules

Fertility Primo- Compro- Equal Primo- Compro- Equal Primo- Compro- Equal
Patterns geniture mise division geniture mise division geniture mise division
Number of children S = Yz, (z= 2 .0)
Rich M.C. Poor

3 2 2 535 535 535 535 535 535 535 535 535
2 2 2 535 535 535 535 535 535 535 535 535
S=(Y-Y)z, (z=2.0)

3 2 2 337 314 298 336 309 281 336 271.
2 2 2 337 335 335 336 331 328 336 282

252
288

Assoozitptions: Standard deviation of random elem
national income is 75 percent; no technological ch
and poor are top and bottom 20 percent of income distribution, respectively.
Basic parameters: 50 familes, 25 generation

Abbreviations: S = personal savings; Y = personal income; Y = average income; z = a constant
a For the equilibrium GNP production at the 25th generation was used as the equilibrium value.
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